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I don't think I shall get there, but it is likely to be interesting. Organised by among others the London LUG - LONIX "Should Security Mechanisms be Secret?" Ross Anderson 6pm (tea) for 6.40pm, Tue 11 Feb 2003 A free-entry talk at City University, London EC1 Please see http://www.lonix.org.uk to register for attendance and to get information about travel and arrival procedure For a web notice for this talk see http://acmbc.soi.city.ac.uk/ Open-source and free software advocates argue that their code is more secure, because vulnerabilities are easier to find and fix. Microsoft argues that this just makes things easier for the attackers; their latest anti-trust settlement makes them share the design of interfaces and protocols - except where security is involved. This debate goes back to the nineteenth century, when people argued about whether it was proper to write books about things like locksmithing and cipher systems. And the excuse `I can't tell you because of security' is not restricted to the software industry. In this talk I will present a surprising new result. I will show that, under the standard assumptions used by the reliability modelling community, the open and closed approaches are equivalent. Opening a system to public inspection helps attack and defence equally. This means that a practical decision on whether to keep the design of a system secret, or to open it to public inspection, will depend on the extent to which it departs from standard assumptions about the statistics of bugs, and on implementation issues such as the rate at which bug fixes are produced and applied. The audience is likly to reflect a wide range of relevant interests and will not need to understand advanced mathematics. For a related paper see http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/toulouse.pdf Ross Anderson (http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14) is Reader in Security Engineering and leader of the security group in the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. His recent textbook, "Security Engineering - A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems" (Wiley 2001) has received widespread acclaim. Ross also chairs the Foundation for Information Policy Research and is a leading activist in defending public information rights in a wide range of areas, especially cryptography and copyright law. The Foundation recently had a key influence on amending the Export Bill to avoid importing the US ban on publishing cryptographic source code. Also of recent note is Ross' Palladium FAQ opposing the Intel/Microsoft plan to embed copyright policing in PC hardware. Organised by the Centre for Software Reliability at City University, ACM British Chapter, LONIX (London Linux User Group), BCS Networks Specialist Group, IEEE Computer Chapter (UK and Republic of Ireland). Local organiser: David Dodson, dcd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, tel 020-7040-8445. -O--<>--O--<>--O--<>--O--<>--O--<>--O--<>--O--<>--O--<>--O--<>--O--<>--O- -- The Mailing List for the Devon & Cornwall LUG Mail majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxx with "unsubscribe list" in the message body to unsubscribe.