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On 06/12/2018 09:28, Eion MacDonald wrote:
Another issue would be that the actual configuration of the core network devices will almost certainly be classified, and I would expect that it would be classified to the highest level, as these devices *will* have intercept configurations to ensure that traffic is copied and recorded for metadata analysis and future decryption (if they can't decrypt it now, then it is likely they will be able to eventually decrypt it in the future). The point being that getting support from China without detailing what the device has been configured to do is nigh on impossible. Whereas, with, say a Cisco manufactured device, I'm sure they have a whole department who deal with NSA allies support issues.On 06/12/2018 09:24, Giles Coochey wrote:On 06/12/2018 07:26, Tom via list wrote:https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/dec/05/bt-removing-huawei-equipment-from-parts-of-4g-network Tom te tom te tomI think the concern is not so much that the equipment is actively spying, but that if tensions were to increase between China and 'The West' that Huawei could cease to support and provide security patches for the equipment installed. If Huawei could prove that it isn't a Chinese State Actor, with say significant domestic R&D & Support within the UK then this wouldn't be so much of a problem. I think this is more pressure from the likes of the NSA on the 5-eyes data surveillance alliance, guided by the Trump administration to put the pliers on the Chinese government due to the ongoing trade disputes.Concur. It is the 'future possibility' that drives "please do not use Huawei" problem for security folk.
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